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Fiduciary Duties of Credit Union Directors in the
Merger Context
Joseph S. Melchione* & Timothy L. Oppeltt
I. INTRODUCTION
As with much of the law concerning credit unions, laws governing
the fiduciary duties of directors and officers of credit unions often lack
content. While the general rule that directors owe a fiduciary duty
seems self-evident, any attempt to find more specific guidance
flounders. Although the law concerning for-profit corporations has
been discussed thoroughly in courts and academic circles, such discus-
sions rarely consider how the law of fiduciary relationships might ap-
ply in the specialized context of a cooperative financial institution like
a credit union.
Fundamental corporate change1 is one of the areas in which it is the
most critical that corporate fiduciaries fulfill their duties, but it is also
one in which the law is the most vague. The day-to-day management
of a credit union does not substantially differ from that of any other
financial institution, at least not enough to affect the assumed applica-
tion of general corporate standards of care and loyalty. Fundamental
corporate change in the credit union context, however, carries with it
important differences. Credit unions are cooperative institutions, op-
erating on a "one-person, one-vote" system. Members of credit unions
do not own stock that can be transferred like the equity ownerships of
stock corporations.2 The nature of credit unions makes the majority of
* Partner, Styskal, Wiese & Melchione; Member, Credit Union Committee of the American
Bar Association, Co-Chair, Governance Sub-Committee; J.D., University of California at Davis;
B.A., University of California at Santa Barbara.
t Associate, Styskal, Wiese & Melchione; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Em-
ory University. The authors would like to thank Hal Scoggins and Christopher Pippett for their
editorial and research contributions .to this article. The authors would also like to thank members
of the Governance Subcommittee of the Credit Union Committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion for their input during the writing of this article.
1. "Fundamental corporate change" is used here as the general term for a change in the capi-
tal structure of an artificial entity, such as a merger, a sale of substantially all of a company's
assets, or, with financial institutions, conversion to another type of charter.
2. Credit union members deposit funds in "share accounts," which have a minimum deposit of
one share, usually between five and twenty-five dollars. With the purchase of a share, the deposi-
tor becomes a member and may use other credit union services. Ownership, ability to use ser-
vices, and deposits are linked, unlike with most stock corporations. When a member wishes to
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for-profit merger law inapplicable except by analogy-one cannot as-
sume that law applicable to specific charter types or particular stock
transactions would be appropriate for different situations. Presently,
the law of fundamental corporate change as it relates to credit unions
remains vague.
This lack of clarity is compounded by the fact that the area of fun-
damental corporate change for credit unions has become increasingly
important. There has been a significant, consistent, and continuing
trend of credit union mergers. Since 1998, an average -of 298 federal
and federally-insured credit union mergers have occurred per year,
and over two thousand credit unions have disappeared in the past dec-
ade.3 Previously unseen merger phenomena, such as hostile merger
offers, have occurred. 4 Financial institution charter type conversions,
mergers, and the issues surrounding these transformations have capti-
vated the credit union industry and trade press.5 And yet, many of
these changes are new enough that commentary on the roles and du-
ties of directors is noticeably absent. While the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCUA")6 has recently begun the process of promul-
leave, sale of the member's share is nearly always made back to the credit union and for the
value paid for it-in essence, a withdrawal.
3. See STYSKAL, WIESE & MELCHIONE, LLP, CUES COMPLETE GUIDE TO MERGERS 16
(Credit Union Executives Society, 2003); STYSKAL, WIESE & MELCHIONE, LLP, CUES COM-
PLETE GUIDE TO MERGERS (Credit Union Executives Society, 2d ed. 2008). Data on state-
chartered credit union mergers is largely unavailable from any central source; however, the
trends appear to carry across this divide.
4. The first hostile merger offer involving a credit union, which occurred in the Spring of 2007,
is discussed in Part IV below.
5. See, e.g., Michelle A. Samaad, Sleepless Nights Aside, Former Nationwide FCU CEO Has
No Doubts Bank Merger was Best for Members, Fought Hard to Return Their Earned Equity,
CREDIT UNION TIMES, May 16, 2007, at 10; James Wilcox, Credit Unions, Conversions, and Capi-
tal, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER (ECONOMIC RESEARCH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F.), June
22, 2007; David Morrison, Dispute at Columbia Leads to Board Members Being Expelled,
CREDIT UNION TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at 1; Paul Gentile, The Good News, Bad News of Lafayette
FCU Conversion, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at 14; Michelle A. Samaad, Texas Credit
Unions Don't Have Much to Say on Unsolicited Merger Proposal, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Aug. 8,
2007, at 3; Ed Roberts, NCUA Is Crafting A Rule to Prevent Hostile Takeovers from Taking
Hold, CREDIT UNION JOURNAL, July 30, 2007, at 1; Paul Seibert, CEOs, Board Must Prepare
Now for Merger Question, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at 17; Casey Connelly, Success-
ful Merger Strategies - Part I, CREDITUNIONS.COM, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.creditunions.com
home/articles/template.asp?articleid=1152; Ed Callahan & Bucky Sebastian, Why a Bank
Merger is Often Bad and a Credit Union Merger Often Good, CREDITUNIONS.COM, June 6, 2005,
http://www.creditunions.com/home/articles/template.asparticle-id=1668.
6. The NCUA is the regulator of federal credit unions. State-chartered credit unions are regu-
lated by state authorities. The NCUA additionally regulates those state-chartered credit unions
that carry federal deposit insurance through the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (a
fund akin to the FDIC), as opposed to private deposit insurance. Thus, state-chartered credit
unions at times have two masters: the NCUA as the deposit insurer, and the state regulator as
the primary regulator.
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gating regulations which may cover the fiduciary duties of federal
credit union directors, 7 this area remains undeveloped and ignored in
academic work.
This article's purpose is to fill some of that void. In general, this
article will discuss the standards that apply in determining whether, in
the context of a merger, be it hostile or consensual, 8 the directors of a
credit union have fulfilled their fiduciary duties.9 Throughout this arti-
cle, the law governing for-profit corporations is applied by analogy to
credit unions. Because Delaware courts have developed the area of
corporate law more thoroughly than other jurisdictions, much of the
law included below is Delaware law. Also included when available is a
discussion of California law, an example of a jurisdiction with separate
statutory schemes for its for-profit and non-profit corporations and
financial institutions.
Rather than detailing the nuances of one area of law, this article
covers its topics generally, providing a survey view of issues in credit
union law which will need to be resolved-through regulation, legisla-
tion, or litigation-in the future. Part II discusses the choice of law
issues in determining the applicable legal standards for state and fed-
eral credit unions. Part III presents certain general principles and con-
cepts concerning fiduciary duties, specifically, to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed, standing to pursue remedies for breach of the duty, the
content of the duty, and the business judgment rule. Part IV analyzes
fiduciary duty in the specific context of consensual mergers. Part V
does the same in the context of a hostile takeover.
7. See Mergers, Conversion From Credit Union Charter, and Account Insurance Termination,
73 Fed. Reg. 5461 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comment Jan. 30,
2008) [hereinafter Mergers, Conversion and Termination Advance Notice]. It is important to
note, also, that this Advance Notice or Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPR") may or may not result
in any rulemaking activity by the NCUA. Therefore, the subject matter of this article remains, in
all regards, a live issue, even for federal credit unions.
8. This article will not discuss fiduciary standards as they relate to conversion from a credit
union to another type of financial institution. While charter conversion is a type of fundamental
corporate change, the relative lack of a for-profit analogue to this type of transaction makes this
issue fundamentally different from mergers, at least in terms of the application of fiduciary duty
law.
9. As noted in one recent article, the law governing fiduciary duties of officers, even those of
for-profit corporations, is often overlooked. See Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty
Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents), 63 Bus. LAW. 147, 148
(2007). The discussion at hand only includes the duties of directors; however, one could specu-
late that the principles behind officer fiduciary and agent duties would not differ significantly
between for-profit and mutual corporations.
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II. CHOICE OF LAW
The first step in determining the applicable legal standards for a
board of directors is determining what jurisdiction's law applies to
that board. For most corporations created by state law, this issue is
easily resolved. Choice of law regarding corporate governance in the
United States is generally decided by the internal affairs doctrine. 10
Under this rule, the law of the jurisdiction in which the organization
was incorporated governs the fiduciary duties and other internal af-
fairs of the organization. For state-chartered credit unions, the law of
the credit union's state of charter applies. Some states charter credit
unions as non-profit mutual benefit corporations,1 others charter
credit unions under specialized financial institution charters,12 and yet
others have no legal basis for forming a state-chartered credit union. 13
Federal credit unions, however, are not chartered under state law;
they are chartered directly by the federal government under the Fed-
eral Credit Union Act ("FCUA"). 14 As with many other areas of fed-
eral law, this immediately raises a fundamental choice of law question
and the question whether courts will create federal common law.
While there has not been a high court ruling on the applicable law for
federal credit unions, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that in the
absence of a federal statute for breaches of fiduciary duty by federal
savings bank officers and directors, courts should apply state law. 15
The decision in Atherton v. FDIC is based on statutes and regulations
that are nearly identical to the corresponding FCUA provisions. 16
Courts would thus not create a federal law of fiduciary duties, but
rather defer to a body of state law corresponding with the geographic
location of the bank or credit union.
The guidance from the Supreme Court makes it unlikely that any
court will decide to create a federal standard for fiduciary duties for
directors of federal credit unions, particularly under the current statu-
tory scheme. However, the NCUA recently made regulatory changes
10. This naturally ignores the increasing federalization of corporate law insofar as it relates to
publicly traded companies.
11. California, for example. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 14100(a) (2008).
12. Pennsylvania, for example. See 17 PA. CONS. STAT. § 301 (2008).
13. Delaware, for example.
14. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000).
15. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 216-26 (1997). This is admittedly a simplification: the
Court in Atherton in fact said that in the absence of a federal statute, there would be no federal
common law for national banks in the context of the fiduciary duty. See id. Additionally, the
Court stated that a federal statute specifying a minimal "gross negligence" standard for liability
to the FDIC did not supplant the application of state fiduciary duty law for other purposes. Id. at
226-31.
16. See id. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1787(h) (2000), with 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2000).
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which create distinctions between the situation in Atherton and the
current credit union regulations and indicate the present attitude of
the NCUA with regard to fiduciary duties. First, the NCUA has
passed a rule that reincorporates the federal credit union bylaws into
the federal regulations. 17 This increases federal control over credit
union corporate governance. Second, the NCUA has adopted new
rules on conversion from a federal credit union charter to a mutual
savings bank charter.18
The commentary accompanying the final rule on conversions states:
"[T]he FCUA imposes a duty to act in the best interests of the mem-
bers on the directors of all federally-insured state-chartered credit un-
ions regardless of whether state law also imposes such a duty." 19 This
implies that the NCUA is creating an independent federal duty, as one
is not explicitly stated in the FCUA. The commentary continues, "the
duty to act in the best interests of members is primary, and, if there is
any divergence or conflict between the interests of the institution and
the interests of members, the latter takes precedence. ' 20 This runs
contrary to the discussion in Atherton, as well as to the assumptions in
various cases addressing fiduciary duties as they apply to credit
unions.21
This recent apparent change in the NCUA's perspective on fiduci-
ary duties may affect the application of the analysis in Atherton to
federal credit unions. Under Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and
subsequent decisions, such as Atherton, federal common law may not
be created unless there is a "significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law."'22 The Supreme Court has
also stated that a desire for "uniformity" by the federal regulator will
not alone support a need for federal common law,23 and that the inter-
nal affairs doctrine will similarly not provide a sufficient reason to cre-
17. Federal Credit Union Bylaws, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,984 (proposed June 5, 2007); Federal Credit
Union Bylaws, 72 Fed. Reg. 61,495 (Oct. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Bylaw Final Rule].
18. Conversion of Insured Credit Unions to Mutual Savings Banks, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,150 (Dec.
22, 2006) [hereinafter Conversion Final Rule].
19. Conversion Final Rule, supra note 18, at 77, 156.
20. Id. at 77, 155.
21. E.g., Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The
parties agree that New York law applies to Gully's claim of breach of fiduciary duty and that the
WFCU is considered a corporation for purposes of New York fiduciary law.").
22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,218 (1997)
(citing Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
23. Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220.
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ate federal common law.24 However, any increase in regulation of
fiduciary duties and corporate governance by the federal government
will increase the likelihood of a conflict between state and federal law,
and will also increase the evidence of a federal legislative or regula-
tory intent to have courts create federal common law.2 5
The increased regulation of corporate governance issues embodied
by the new conversion rules and the reincorporation of the federal
credit union bylaws into the federal register does increase the possibil-
ity of a conflict, but does not necessarily create one in and of itself.
The current regulation still leaves substantial room for the application
of state law in defining fiduciary duties. Thus, the Atherton decision
will likely apply to federal credit unions, even though the additional
regulation on the NCUA's part may help push the analysis in favor of
creating or reviving a federal common law of fiduciary duties. 26
If state law applies to federal credit union fiduciary duties, then a
determination must be made as to which state's law applies. The Ath-
erton Court suggested a court might (but would not have to) apply the
fiduciary duty law of the state where the organization's principal place
of business rests.27
In a similar vein, Feuchtwanger Corp. v. Lake Hiawatha Federal
Credit Union held that the location of the business of a federal credit
union, especially one with a local community charter, should be its
citizenship for the purpose of hailing the credit union into federal
court.28 Some of the reasoning in Feuchtwanger, however, suggests
that this basis for citizenship should not be used to determine an anal-
ogous state of incorporation for purposes of the internal affairs doc-
trine.29 The Feuchtwanger court noted that, in future cases, it might
also consider federal credit unions to be citizens of any state where
24. This is because the internal affairs doctrine "seeks only to avoid conflict by requiring that
there be a single point of legal reference" as to the law on fiduciary duty that applies to a corpo-
ration. Id. at 224.
25. See id. at 219-26.
26. It is important to note that, at least in the area of mergers, the NCUA may create a federal
fiduciary duty standard, as suggested by some passages in its recent ANPR. See Mergers, Con-
version and Termination Advance Notice, supra note 7, at 5464 ("NCUA believes having a uni-
form federal standard may be useful to eliminate confusion resulting from differences in state
law and may make it easier for credit union boards to fulfill their duties to members."). It re-
mains to be seen whether such a duty would be upheld as within the Administration's rulemak-
ing authority.
27. Atherton, 519 U.S. at 224 ("In the absence of a governing federal common law, courts
applying the internal affairs doctrine could find (we do not say that they will find) that the State
closest analogically to the State of incorporation of an ordinary business is the State in which the
federally chartered bank has its main office or maintains its principal place of business.").
28. 272 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1959).
29. Id.
[Vol. 7:203
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they do significant business, due to the public policy of expanding cor-
porate citizenship for diversity purposes.30 This would mean that
under Feuchtwanger, a federal credit union could easily be considered
a citizen of multiple states for diversity purposes; under the internal
affairs doctrine, an organization can only have the fiduciary duty law
of one state apply.
Thus, for federal credit unions operating in more than one state,
Feuchtwanger does not seem to provide guidance on which state's law
should apply. Common sense suggests that if there is a state in which
either the majority of operations occur or the headquarters and ma-
jority of management are located, then that state's law will apply.31
This reliance on "common sense" and ill-fitting principles from the
law of personal jurisdiction, however, does not contribute to solid le-
gal analysis. It appears that, for federal credit unions and other feder-
ally-chartered corporations, a lack of federal legislation and regulation
of fiduciary duties creates significant gaps in the legal landscape.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES: IN GENERAL
It is generally accepted that directors of corporations are fiduciaries
of the corporation. Corporate fiduciary law has, since its inception,
slowly morphed from a mirror of the law of trusts to a uniquely corpo-
rate body of law. 32 Absent case law, there remains an open debate
whether a "trustee" standard applies to credit unions, or whether
courts and regulators would apply the modern corporate standards.
Given the trends in the last century of case law, courts will likely con-
tinue expanding the application of the corporate fiduciary standards
to credit unions, as they have with most other types of business enti-
ties. Thus, this article focuses on the modern law of fiduciary duties as
30. See id. at 454-56.
31. This resembles, but is not identical to, some of the law governing corporate citizenship for
the purposes of personal jurisdiction, such as the so-called "nerve center" or "plurality" tests.
However, as noted above, the exact analysis for the purposes of personal jurisdiction cannot
apply for purposes of identifying a single state whose governance law would apply to a federal
credit union.
32. See Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corpo-
rate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 37 (2005) ("The
fiduciary duty concept is derived from the common law of trusts, but has been modified in its
application to the business context."). Much later in the history of our legal system, this same
change took place in relation to non-profit organizations in many jurisdictions. See La. World
Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The standard of care for a
director of a nonprofit corporation was long held to be more demanding than that for a director
of a for-profit business. The theory was that a nonprofit corporation was analogous to a public
trust, and its directors were deemed its trustees. However, modern statutes and case law have
altered that, and now the standard for nonprofit corporate directors is usually the same as that of
their for-profit counterparts.").
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the most likely to be applied to credit unions today, at least in the
absence of legislation or regulation to the contrary.
This section covers the general principles of corporate fiduciary du-
ties, including issues of: (1) to whom the duties are owed; (2) standing
to pursue remedies for breach of the duty; (3) the content of those
duties; and (4) the safeguard of the business judgment rule. The dis-
cussion below takes into account federal, Delaware, and California
law on the duties owed by directors.
As a note, this section and this article in general do not focus on a
director's best behavior. The Delaware Supreme Court has succinctly
defined the distinction between the law of liability for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and the goals of good governance practices:
All good corporate governance practices include compliance with
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties. But the law
of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those du-
ties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate gov-
ernance practices. Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance
practices for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend
to benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually
help directors avoid liability. But they are not required by the cor-
poration law and do not define standards of liability. 33
Keeping in mind this distinction between minimum legal standards
and the spirit of the fiduciary duty, the following discussions will
largely be based on the minimum standards that define liability but
will occasionally examine when the "aspirational goals" of corporate
governance would dictate a significantly different course of action.
A. To Whom the Duty is Owed
This section discusses the law applicable to the "direct object" of
the fiduciary duty, to use a grammatical term. Different jurisdictions
apply this duty differently, with two distinct possible parties to whom
directors and officers can owe such a duty-the members, or the cor-
porate entity itself. The following three sections describe federal law,
California law, and Delaware law. Section 4 below discusses the im-
portance of this question in the context of credit union fiduciary du-
ties, particularly in the context of fundamental corporate change.
1. Federal Law
According to the internal affairs doctrine discussed above, any fed-
eral law addressing fiduciary duties only applies to federally-chartered
33. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
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institutions.34 However, federal law dictates the content of the fiduci-
ary duty only when an applicable statute or regulation exists; thus, the
existence of federal law varies depending on the type of federally-
chartered institution in question. Currently, there is no clear judicial
analysis or determination on the subject of a federal common law fi-
duciary duty for credit unions. The NCUA has frequently asserted
that the fiduciary duty is owed to both the credit union and its mem-
bers, and the commentary accompanying recently adopted regulations
clearly affirms this principle.35 Previous litigation, however, largely
left this determination up to state law.36 As demonstrated by some
recent state court cases involving state-chartered credit unions, state
law may not provide credit union members with any cause of action
by which to enforce such duties. 37 Thus, while specific federal regula-
tions may dictate duties to members in certain circumstances-such as
disclosures or charter conversion deliberations-it remains unclear
whether courts will universally be willing to enforce fiduciary duties to
the extent that the NCUA might wish.
2. California Law
Pursuant to statute, directors in California stock corporations owe a
duty to both the corporation and the shareholders. 38 The California
Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation law only includes an explicit
duty to the corporation.39 However, this may merely reflect the fact
that mutual benefit corporations may or may not have members.
When taken as a whole, the Mutual Benefit law does contemplate that
directors owe some duties to the membership, but more in the sense
that they are representatives of the corporation as a charitable trust,
with the directors as trustees.40 To confuse the issue further, in dicta,
at least one case has stated that directors of nonprofit corporations are
deemed to be agents and fiduciaries of the members, and are also
shielded by the business judgment rule.41 The ambiguity in this area
makes it difficult to assess whether members of California credit un-
34. This assumes that Congress will not choose to preempt state chartering of credit unions or
state governance law as it relates to state chartered credit unions via new legislation.
35. Conversion Final Rule, supra note 18, at 77, 153.
36. E.g., Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003).
37. E.g., Save Columbia Credit Union Comm. v. Columbia Cmty. Credit Union, 139 P.3d 386
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
38. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (2008).
39. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7231(a).
40. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 7142; see also CAL. CORP. § 7710.
41. See Lee v. Interinsurance Exch., 50 Cal. App. 4th 694, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
2009]
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ions would be able to sue directors for a breach of duty even under a
derivative theory.
3. Delaware Law
Delaware courts have held that directors owe a duty to both the
corporation and the shareholders.42 Because Delaware has no statute
providing for the chartering of credit unions, there are no state-
chartered credit unions in Delaware. Therefore, if state law is applied
to a federal credit union in Delaware, the general provisions of Dela-
ware corporate law would apply and duties would theoretically also
extend to credit union members.
4. Importance and Implication of the "To Whom" Question
The determination of the party to whom the duty is owed will nec-
essarily dictate the information the directors must consider in making
a particular decision. If the duty is owed only to the credit union as an
entity, mergers or conversions that adversely affect services to mem-
bers may, in some instances, be more acceptable. In such a scenario,
the more important considerations may be whether the merger will
positively affect the credit union's capital, profitability, and security.
While these are also important considerations when a fiduciary duty is
owed to members, a change in focus to the members raises additional
considerations, such as the quality of member service and rates on
member loans and accounts. That the distinction could be plausibly
made by a court can be seen in a Rhode Island case, Harritos v.
Cambio, in which the court did not even consider whether there was a
breach of fiduciary duty by directors because the court found that no
duty was owed to the plaintiff members. 43 The court concluded that
the members were merely borrowers from, rather than owners of, the
institution.44
B. Standing to Pursue Remedies for Breach of the Duty
Parallel to the "to whom" question is the question of standing: Who
may enforce a duty in a court of law? A major limitation on any legal
duty is its enforceability in a court of law. Ability to enforce a duty can
42. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
43. No. 92-1162, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 58 (1996).
44. Id.; Another Rhode Island case held that depositors at a credit union could not assert
derivative claims, and instead, left any assertion of claims on behalf of the institution up to the
receiver. In re RISDIC Litigation, 662 A.2d 64, 66 (R.I. 1995). The answer to the question of to
whom a duty is owed is also affected by a determination of who may assert claims based on legal
requirements.
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be assessed from two standpoints: (1) whether the individual suing to
enforce the duty may do so, and (2) under what cause of action the
person suing may do so. Without standing to sue and a cause of action
under which to sue, individuals have no recourse in court.
While other entities, such as a state or federal regulator, might have
the ability to police the behavior of a director or officer in relation to
the members of a credit union, this would be correctly termed a duty
to the regulator with the membership as the beneficiary, rather than a
duty to the members. Specific legal requirements for disclosure to
members do not necessarily create duties to members; rather, they cre-
ate obligations to act in certain ways.
As an example of this distinction, the NCUA has the power to issue
orders of prohibition against officers, directors, or other "institution-
affiliated parties" of federally insured credit unions for "any act, omis-
sion, or practice which constitutes a breach of such party's fiduciary
duty."' 45 The NCUA has interpreted this statute as implying a fiduciary
duty to the members of a credit union.46 However, the sources cited
by the NCUA in this area either do not relate to credit unions or in-
volve actions, or inactions, that are clearly a conflict of interest-ille-
gal loans to relatives, embezzling, and the like.47 Thus, the content of
such an implied duty, if it exists, particularly in the context of a
merger, remains unexplored. Additionally, as discussed below, it re-
mains unclear whether private parties, particularly members, may
seek redress for breaches of this implied fiduciary duty. To call this
sort of requirement on credit union directors a "fiduciary duty" is thus
a misnomer, at best.
1. Standing
Generally, courts will only hear cases in which the plaintiffs have
standing. In federal courts, the minimum requirements of standing are
injury, causation, and redressability.4 These prerequisites require
members of a credit union who wish to dispute a director's action to
have a legally recognized injury. Accordingly, the ability to file suit
based on a statutory or common law cause of action is vital to estab-
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(1)(A) (2000); also see 12 C.F.R. § 701.14(e) (2007).
46. See In re Majette, Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. Final Decision & Order, Docket No. 98-
0401-11 (1999) ("It is well accepted law that officers and directors of depository institutions are
held by a strict fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the institution, its shareholders and its
depositors.") (citing Grubb v. FDIC, 34 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Bush, OTS Order No.
AP 91-16, 1991 WL 540753 (Apr. 18, 1991)). Harritos, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 58; RISDIC
Litigation, 662 A.2d at 66.
47. See Grubb, 34 F.3d 956; Matter of Neil M. Bush, 1991 WL 540753.
48. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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lishing a legally cognizable duty. Thus, the standing requirement inter-
twines with the issues discussed in Part A above.
In a recent case, Save Columbia Credit Union Committee v. Colum-
bia Community Credit Union, a Washington court denied a member
standing because the applicable statute governing fiduciary duty said
only that directors owed a duty to the credit union and did not include
a duty to the members.49 Because the statute did not provide the
members with a legally cognizable interest,50 they were deemed not to
have been injured in a legally cognizable way by the actions of the
directors and thus had no standing. Without the standing to sue, there
remained no recourse for Columbia's members. By eliminating the di-
rectors' duties to the members, the court effectively restricted over-
sight of directors and officers to regulators and the supervisory
committee. This is a prime example of how the question of "to whom
the duty is owed" determines the remedies available to members. In
order to have standing to sue, members must assert an injury based on
a statute that supplies them with a legal interest that can be injured.
2. Available Remedies
Beyond the question of standing is the question of the remedy itself.
Under a tort action for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff would
normally be entitled to recover those damages caused by the breach.
In the corporate context, such actions are usually brought in a deriva-
tive form-an individual shareholder sues the corporation as an entity
to force it to bring suit against a director, rather than a suit being filed
in the names of any individual shareholders against a director.51 The
concept of a derivative action springs from the notion that the direc-
tors' fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation or the shareholders in
general, rather than any individual shareholder.5 2 In general, it is diffi-
cult to bring derivative actions involving stock corporations as multi-
ple barriers have been erected to protect management from frivolous
actions.53
Rights to bring derivative actions, like other proceedings in this
area, are usually created by statutes-while some courts have estab-
49. 139 P.3d 386, 392-93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
50. The court denied standing because the Washington statutes controlling fiduciary duties of
credit union directors provided only that directors "stand in a fiduciary relationship to the credit
union." See WASH. REV. CODE § 31.12.267 (2008). Note that neither the Federal Credit Union
Act nor NCUA Rules and Regulations contain a similar statement.
51. See Baums & Scott, supra note 32, at 49.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 49-50.
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lished common law derivative actions,54 such decisions have not been
the norm. Without the statutory ability to file derivative or individual
tort actions against directors, equity owners typically have no re-
course. For federal credit unions, it appears that the derivative action
has largely been overlooked, 55 while for some state-chartered credit
unions, derivative actions are available by virtue of state corporate
law.56 Considering the relatively "endangered" nature of derivative
suits in the United States,57 their applications to credit unions are
likely limited even if additional legislation is enacted.
An alternative course for equity owners is an action for appraisal.
In the corporate context, these actions can generally only be brought
upon an instance of a merger or other buy-out by a dissenting share-
holder.58 A court ruling on an appraisal action performs a valuation of
the corporation, compares the results to the valuation performed by
the corporation before the merger and the corresponding compensa-
tion to shareholders, and awards the difference to the dissenting
shareholders who filed suit.59
An appraisal right can be found in a federal bank statute, the ABA
Model Business Corporation Act, and various states' laws. Under the
National Bank Act, dissenting shareholders in mergers of national
banks or state banks into national banks may request the fair value of
their shares in return for the surrender of their stock certificates.60
Under the National Bank Act scheme, valuation is made by a commit-
tee selected in part by both the majority stockholders and the dissent-
54. E.g., Tzolis v. Wolff, 884 N.E.2d 1005, 1008-10 (N.Y. 2008).
55. There is no provision in the Federal Credit Union Act or the NCUA's Rules and Regula-
tions providing for derivative or direct causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
56. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 7710 (2008) (providing for derivative actions by members of
California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporations).
57. See Baums & Scott, supra note 32, at 50.
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2008). But see FLA. STAT. § 607.1302 (2008). Ap-
praisal statutes are generally limited to their purposes: providing minority shareholders a "way
out" of an altered investment. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy
and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 613-16 (1998). One can see why share-
holders should not be permitted to demand a "buyback" of their shares in a situation in which
they are not already receiving cash in return for their equity interests. While the Delaware stat-
ute limits appraisals to mergers or consolidations, Florida appraisal rights extend to changes to
Articles of Incorporation that would change the relative value of shares. Compare DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262, with FLA. STAT. § 607.1302.
59. Commentators have questioned the efficiency of the appraisal remedy. E.g., Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., Change of Control Board: Federal Preemption of the Law Governing a Target's
Directors, 70 Miss. L.J. 35, 94-96 (2000). This article does not examine the merits of appraisal
actions, but rather merely notes that this is one option normally available to stock institutions
which is not currently available to credit unions.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(b) (2000).
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ing stockholders.61 Chapter 13 of the Model Business Corporation Act
also provides an appraisal right with slightly different aspects. 62
In some jurisdictions, a dissenting shareholder in a merger is limited
to an action for appraisal-derivative actions are largely unavailable.
For example, due to the statutory scheme, the usual remedy in Cali-
fornia for dissenting shareholders in a merger is an action for ap-
praisal, rather than a suit for breach of fiduciary duty.63 For California
stock corporations, this has the effect of nearly eliminating the breach
of fiduciary duty cause of action in the merger context (and conse-
quently any case law clarifying those duties).
Note that most of the statutes on appraisal mentioned above apply
to stock institutions, not credit unions or other mutual institutions.
Because rights to bring actions for appraisal are created by statutes,64
they do not apply unless a statutory or regulatory scheme so provides.
Thus, there is no appraisal right in most credit union mergers. This
leaves the primary cause of action and remedy as an action for breach
of fiduciary duty, though, as seen above, such a cause of action is not
so readily available.
Despite the enforcement and procedural limitations discussed
above, which necessarily define the contours of the fiduciary duty, the
content of the duty remains important. An understanding of the inter-
play between enforcement mechanisms and the content of the duty is
vital to understanding the legal landscape in this area. The following
sections discuss the content and substantive limitations on the fiduci-
ary duties of directors of credit unions.
C. Content of the Duty and General Principles
Fiduciary duty is commonly referred to as having three separate
components: good faith, loyalty, and care.65 The duty of good faith has
largely been subsumed into the duties of loyalty and care. Under Del-
aware law, the duty of good faith cannot in itself give rise to director
liability.66 Instead, a breach of the duty of good faith indirectly leads
to liability by showing a breach of the duty of loyalty.67 This is because
61. § 215a(c).
62. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13 (2008).
63. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1300, 1312 (2008).
64. Some courts did, prior to the wide-spread adoption of appraisal statutes, conclude that the
proper remedy for a dissenting shareholder was a "pro rata share of the corporation's value."
Wertheimer, supra note 58, at 619 n.29. Currently, however, actions for appraisal are invoked in
the context of specific charter-related statutes.
65. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
66. Id. at 369-70.
67. Id. at 370.
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a "director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts
in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best
interest." 68
1. Loyalty
The duty of loyalty is the duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation and/or its shareholders. In conjunction with the duty of
good faith, the duty of loyalty encompasses three types of situations:
(1) where directors have some financial or other cognizable fiduciary
conflict of interest; (2) where directors fail to act in good faith; and (3)
where directors act to perpetuate themselves in office.
a. Conflicts of Interest or Self-dealing
Common examples of conflicts of interest, also known as "self-deal-
ing," include: being a director of both the merging and the continuing
credit union; selling property or providing services to the credit union;
or receiving some sort of consideration or benefit as a result of an
action upon which the director votes. Self-dealing does not, however,
include an interest the director holds as a shareholder of the corpora-
tion or an interest that is the same as that available to all shareholders
alike. 69 Thus, opportunities to sell or buy stock, or distributions on
accounts that are the same for all members, will not generally be seen
as self-dealing under the law. Nonetheless, to fulfill the aspirational
ideals of the fiduciary duty, directors should not structure a transac-
tion in a manner that enables them to benefit from a stock purchase or
other incentive plan if that plan will not be used by the majority of
members or if it will diminish services that the members use and en-
joy. The stock-purchase context is one in which the law and the ideals
of fiduciary duty diverge.
Self-dealing does not always cause a breach of the fiduciary duty,
however. Most jurisdictions allow for some method by which directors
can disclose the conflict of interest, recuse themselves, or submit the
matter to a shareholder vote.70 Dual directorships are often covered in
statutes that allow for disclosure and recusal in the face of a conflict of
68. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. 2003)).
69. "The mere fact that some of the ... directors were substantial shareholders does not
create a personal pecuniary interest in the decisions made by the board of directors, since all
shareholders would presumably share the benefit flowing to the substantial shareholder." Cheff
v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). Developments in the law after Cheffhave clarified that
there are some cases in which substantial or majority control of stock in a company can create a
conflict of interest. Thus the rule is that the interest must be shared with the other shareholders.
70. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008).
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interest.71 Interested director transactions are similarly often permissi-
ble despite a conflict of interest if certain steps are taken to ratify the
transaction. In many states, ratification can occur through a vote of
the disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders or through a
determination of fairness by a court.72
Disclosure and subsequent approval by disinterested parties is not
without its wrinkles though. Many jurisdictions have determined that
directors need only disclose to shareholders those material facts re-
garding a particular action which might benefit their personal inter-
ests.73 The rationale is that requiring disclosure of all facts would
increase the costs of decision-making and paralyze boards. Material
facts are defined as those that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider important in deciding how to vote on a given issue.74
However, exceptions exist to the materiality rule. Some courts, par-
ticularly in Delaware, have adopted a "self-flagellation" doctrine,
which exempts directors from characterizing their behavior as inter-
ested, negative, or illegal. 75 The rationale behind the "self-flagella-
tion" rule is that directors should not have to speculate about how
their conduct will be characterized or publicly admit misconduct.76
Sometimes this doctrine even exempts directors from fully describing
the facts surrounding a transaction, thus negating the initial public
policy motivation of allowing shareholders to judge facts for them-
selves.77 Federal courts have applied a similar test-leaving character-
izations up to shareholders-though the courts have generally
required full disclosure of facts.78 Even under the federal test some
facts are frequently omitted, such as those suggesting motivations con-
trary to shareholders' best interests.79
This prohibition on self-flagellation effectively exempts directors
from admitting to wrongdoing, decreasing the chance that sharehold-
71. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 7233(b) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a).
72. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 7233(a). Note that a recent Delaware Supreme Court case,
Gantler v. Stephens, which is as yet not certified for publication, supplies additional guidance on
the Delaware rules on ratification. No. 32, 2008, 2009 WL 188828, at *13, n.54 (Del. 2009).
73. See, e.g., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 137 (Del. 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)-(2).
74. Loudon, 700 A.2d at 143.
75. "[A] board is not required to engage in 'self-flagellation' and draw legal conclusions impli-
cating itself in a breach of fiduciary duty from surrounding facts and circumstances prior to a
formal adjudication of the matter." Id. at 143 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del.
1992)).
76. Id. at 143.
77. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and
the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 643, 671-74 (2003).
78. Id. at 674-75.
79. Id. at 676; see, e.g., Mendell v. Greenberg, 927 F.2d 667, 673-76 (2d Cir. 1991).
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ers will acquire evidence of self-dealing that might lead them to bring
an action for breach of fiduciary duty. While the self-flagellation doc-
trine does not create a substantive rule or a specific standard, it does
provide directors with significant protection. In conjunction with the
business judgment rule, described in depth in the sections below, the
exceptions to the materiality rule effectively shield directors from lia-
bility by removing information and shifting burdens to those without
said information.
In contrast to the disclosure and ratification standards present in
some jurisdictions, others follow a recusal standard. An example of a
pure recusal standard, the Federal Credit Union Bylaws, recently rein-
corporated into the NCUA Rules and Regulations, 0 state:
No director, committee member, officer, agent, or employee of this
credit union may participate in any manner, directly or indirectly, in
the deliberation upon or the determination of any question affecting
his or her pecuniary or personal interest or the pecuniary interest of
any corporation, partnership, or association (other than this credit
union) in which he or she is directly or indirectly interested.81
The regulations covering federal credit unions thus contain a strict
prohibition on director participation in deliberations that involve a
conflict of interest. This does not, by itself, require a director's pecuni-
ary interest in a transaction be disclosed to the members of a credit
union, however.
b. Good Faith
Failure to act in good faith is usually found only when a director
acts in a way that would have an adverse impact on the credit union,
such as selling assets for less than market value. A director need not
reap a personal benefit from the act for it to be contrary to the inter-
ests of the credit union.
80. Bylaw Final Rule, supra note 17.
81. Federal Credit Union Bylaws, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,551 (April 26, 2006). This section continues:
In the event of the disqualification of any director respecting any matter presented to
the board for deliberation or determination, that director must withdraw from the de-
liberation or determination; and if the remaining qualified directors present at the
meeting plus the disqualified director or directors constitute a quorum, the remaining
qualified directors may exercise with respect to this matter, by majority vote, all the
powers of the board. In the event of the disqualification of any member of the credit
committee, if applicable, or the supervisory committee, that committee member must
withdraw from the deliberation or determination.
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c. Perpetuation in Office or Entrenchment
Self-perpetuation in office, possibly the most common example of a
director pushing the limits of the duty of loyalty, occurs when a direc-
tor acts or votes with the motivation of ensuring his continued partici-
pation on the board of directors.8 2 In the non-merger context, this can
include using corporate funds for proxy contests. In the merger con-
text, as discussed at length below, self-perpetuation often includes ne-
gotiating and voting on the merger based on who will get to
participate on the board of the continuing credit union.
2. Duty of Care
A common statement of the duty of care dictates that directors act
with such care "as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances. '8 3 This reads as a codification
of the standard for negligence, but, as seen below, the standard under
the business judgment rule is often stated as gross negligence. The
duty of care has often been further interpreted to mean that directors
must act with the diligence they would show toward their personal
transactions, including inquiring as to details, having sufficient infor-
mation and time for deliberation, and using sound business judgment
as to the efficacy of the transaction. This standard is discussed in
greater detail below in the context of a consensual merger.
D. The Business Judgment Rule
All of these duties are modified in part by the protections afforded
to director decisions by the business judgment rule. While the specifics
of the rule vary from state to state, the general business judgment rule
has been a part of corporate law in the United States for over 150
years.84 The Delaware business judgment rule is both a procedural
and substantive rule.85 The essence of the rule is that a court will not
inquire into the substantive result of a business decision if the direc-
tors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief
that the action was taken in the best interest of the company.86 If the
rule attaches, then it is up to the shareholder challenging the business
decision to show there was a breach of fiduciary duty.8 7 The rule at-
82. Cf Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
83. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (2008); see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891).
84. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93
(1979).
85. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 361.
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taches when the action taken was within the authority of the board
and there is no evidence of fraud, bad faith, or "self-dealing. ' 88 As
discussed below, the tests to determine whether there is evidence of
bad faith or self-dealing vary depending on the circumstances.
The business judgment rule does not define good practice and
proper performance for directors. Rather, it defines what courts are
willing to examine. This distinction is important because the standards
outlined under any business judgment rule analysis are not aspira-
tional goals-they are minimum standards, the outer limits of what
might be acceptable board performance. To avoid litigation, directors
should ideally exceed the requirements of the business judgment rule,
following the spirit of the duties of care and loyalty rather than the
limits of liability.89 If a director's performance is within the standards
of the business judgment rule, it does not matter what decision is
reached or action is taken so long as that decision is rational. A court
will let rest any rational and well-informed decision as a product of
sound business judgment, even if the results of the decision are disas-
trous to the corporation or shareholders.
If a decision fails to meet the standards of the business judgment
rule, then a court will test the decision to determine whether it was in
fact in the best interests of the corporation and shareholders. The test
for fairness under Delaware law, known as the "entire fairness" doc-
trine, was established in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.90 Because Wein-
berger involved a cash-out merger, the standard and discussion below
specifically apply to a merger scenario, but the standard arguably ap-
plies to other types of transactions as well. 91 The Weinberger standard
divides fairness into two categories, "fair dealing and fair price,"
which are taken together as a whole. 92
An analysis of fair dealing involves an examination of candor to the
corporation and shareholders, as well as the depth of negotiations,
88. Id. at 360. No evidence of "self dealing" in this context means there is no "personal profit
or betterment" for the directors outside of their roles as shareholders. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying note 33.
90. 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Weinberger did not itself establish so broad a rule as this.
The Weinberger court, dealing with a duty of loyalty question skipped over the question of the
business judgment rule. See id. at 708-11. However, this can easily be taken as a leap in logic,
rather than a change in rule. This is because the evidence of a breach of the duty of loyalty
immediately took the case out of the purview of the business judgment rule. This aspect of the
business judgment rule is explained in greater detail in the sections below relating to consensual
mergers.
91. In fact, Delaware courts are likely to apply the "entire fairness" standard whenever the
business judgment rule is rebutted no matter whether the board decision is a transaction at all.
See Gantler v. Stephens, No. 132, 2008, 2009 WL 188828, at *9 (Del. 2009).
92. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
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time constraints on the decision, and the structure of the transaction.
Ideally, none of these aspects should be dictated entirely by one party
to the transaction, and each should be dealt with in a way that serves
the interests of the shareholders. In Weinberger, information on the
price that the purchaser was able and willing to pay was withheld from
minority shareholders, 93 the target company's board had only four
days to consider the offer, 94 and the transaction was not completed as
an "arm's length" deal.95 Together, these factors made the process po-
tentially "unfair."
Fair price is determined by assessing the value of the corporation as
compared to the value the shareholders received for their shares. 96
The Weinberger court rejected previously used rigid valuation meth-
ods and instead adopted a more liberal approach, including "proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered
acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in
court. ' 97 This includes considerations of "market value, asset value,
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise," and any
future prospects of the merged corporation.98 Fair price can also in-
clude damages the shareholders sustain as a class due to the improper
transaction.99
Although California law on the business judgment rule is less exten-
sive than Delaware law, California courts have provided some gui-
dance as to fiduciary duties and the application of the business
judgment rule. Unfortunately, most of the relevant cases contain
sparse recitations of the facts, and most are appealed on pleading re-
quirements and qualifications for derivative suits rather than on the
substantive standards of director fiduciary duties. Thus, they provide
little guidance as to specific steps directors and officers must take in
fulfilling their duties.
Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc. explains the California stance on the bus-
iness judgment rule in the merger context:
In the context of merger negotiations, "[a] 'target' corporation's de-
cision to accept or resist a takeover bid ... necessarily rests with the
board of directors, since it is the directors, and not the shareholders,
who are best able to evaluate the numerous and often complex fi-
nancial factors which must be considered in determining whether
93. Id. at 709.
94. Id. at 711.
95. Id. at 710.
96. See id. at 712-15.
97. Id. at 713.
98. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
99. Id.
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the takeover proposal serves the best interests of the corporation."
A plaintiff challenging a decision made in this context must be able
to make specific allegations of malfeasance or bad faith. Where an
improper motive is claimed, plaintiff must allege that it was the sole
or primary reason for the directors' actions. 100
The presumption that the board's decision was based on sound busi-
ness judgment can only be rebutted "by a factual showing of fraud,
bad faith or gross overreaching.' 1 1 This definition of the business
judgment rule is similar to the Delaware rule stated above, and, as in
Delaware, the business judgment rule sets a lower bar for director de-
cisions to avoid liability than the statute that defines the duty of
care. 102 California courts have further explained that when the busi-
ness judgment rule attaches, the decision will not be disturbed unless
the decision "could not be construed as incidental or expedient for the
attainment of corporate purposes. ' 10 3 For the past decade, the lan-
guage in California cases has shifted to include the wording of Dela-
ware law, largely due to Katz v. Chevron Corporation, a California
case that applied Delaware corporate law.' 04
In the event that directors lose the protection of the business judg-
ment rule, California courts will have to apply a valuation test, just as
Delaware courts would in similar circumstances apply the Weinberger
fairness test.
This general discussion of fiduciary duties gives some indication of
the standards that would be applied to an examination of director ac-
tion in the context of a merger. Sections IV and V below discuss these
standards in the specific contexts of consensual mergers and hostile
mergers.
100. 186 Cal. App. 3d 767, 776-77 (1986) (quoting Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates, 600 F.
Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985)) (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 776.
102. Compare Eldridge, 186 Cal. App. 3d 767 ("fraud, bad faith or gross overreaching"), with
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 309, 7231 (2008) (with the care "an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances"). California has not adopted the Model
Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") in its entirety: California Corporations Code § 309 corre-
sponds with MBCA § 8.30 on director standards of conduct, which is followed by MBCA § 8.31
on standards for liability. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (2008), with MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (1979). MBCA § 8.30 is the codification of the business judgment rule, whereas
Corporations Code § 309 is the codification of fiduciary duty. California has not enacted a codifi-
cation of the business judgment rule.
103. Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 324 (1975); Eldridge, 186 Cal.
App. 3d at 776.
104. 22 Cal. App. 4th 1352 (1994).
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IV. CONSENSUAL MERGERS
Putting together the principles outlined in Section III above, absent
bad faith, self-dealing, fraud, or gross negligence, a director's decision
to authorize a consensual merger will not expose the director to liabil-
ity for breach of fiduciary duty so long as that decision is not irra-
tional. As discussed in Section V below, a different rule applies to
hostile takeovers due to the inherent dangers of self-dealing and en-
trenchment in such a context. This section discusses the standards ap-
plicable in the consensual merger context only.
A. Business Judgment Rule and Particular Ways to Lose
Its Protection
As previously stated, the business judgment rule protects boards
from court scrutiny of their decisions. Because this is a "substantive"
rule, the beginning of any examination of fiduciary duties is the busi-
ness judgment rule. As noted above, the limits of the business judg-
ment rule's protections are the threshold requirements for proper
director action. The following are the clear categories of actions that
will take a decision outside of the rule's protection. 0 5
1. Actions Not Within the Authority of the Board
If an action is ultra vires, or outside of the powers available to the
corporation or credit union in its articles of incorporation,'0 6 then it
will not be protected by the business judgment rule. Examples of ultra
vires actions might be a credit union board attempting to perform ac-
tions which are forbidden to it by its chartering statutes. The ultra
vires doctrine is rarely invoked in modern corporate law due to the
general charters used by most corporations. While ultra vires occasion-
ally finds its way into rhetoric in credit union governance disputes, the
doctrine rarely receives the same attention in actual litigation or rules
of decision. The danger for directors in the merger context is that if a
board attempts a merger without receiving proper shareholder or reg-
ulatory approval, the board's actions may not be protected by the bus-
iness judgment rule.
105. The following situations are taken from the Delaware common law business judgment
rule. As concisely stated in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the business judgment rule attaches
when the action taken was within the authority of the board, there is no evidence of fraud, no
evidence of bad faith, and no evidence of self-dealing. 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
106. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1357 (11th ed. 2005).
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2. Evidence of Bad Faith
As demonstrated by the previous discussion, the specific elements
of bad faith are difficult to define. Evidence of bad faith will arise
when it is clear that directors are placing the interests of some third
party above those of the credit union. Examples in the corporate set-
ting include situations where directors consider interests of bond and
debenture holders above those of shareholders. In the credit union
context, this distinction breaks down because most creditors to and
borrowers from credit unions are credit union members. In general,
though, excessive consideration of constituencies other than the mem-
bers as a whole may result in the loss of the business judgment rule's
protection.
3. Evidence of Self-dealing
As detailed in the previous sections on the duty of loyalty, self-deal-
ing is often defined as using the corporation for personal profit or
betterment. As noted above, some transactions involving directors or
that benefit directors are not breaches of the directors' fiduciary du-
ties. Federal credit union bylaws prohibit directors to participate in
deliberations on such transactions, but allow the transactions to take
place otherwise. State law often allows for disclosure of any interest,
or in some cases disclosure and approval by disinterested parties, as a
way to validate an otherwise self-interested transaction. The law on
ratification of interested transactions varies from jurisdiction to juris-
diction and can be limited by protective doctrines such as, for exam-
ple, the "self-flagellation" rule.
4. Evidence of Fraud
Even in those situations where directors' actions are not character-
ized as self-dealing, making false statements can cause directors to
lose the protection of the business judgment rule. Naturally "fraud"
carries with it other technical legal definitions, though directors will
still wish to avoid knowingly making any false statements to share-
holders or other directors.
5. Gross Negligence
A showing of gross negligence is the general standard for rebutting
the presumption contained in the business judgment rule; it does not
automatically bar application of the business judgment rule.10 7 Gross
negligence is generally proven by showing a complete lack of care, or
107. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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a behavior approaching recklessness.' 0 8 This standard is nebulous, and
generally courts are unwilling to supply it with specific content. As
one court suggested in the context of director fiduciary duties:
It is impossible to establish an exact measure of care which will be
deemed sufficient, or negligence which will be deemed culpable,
with respect to the duty owing on the part of directors and officers
of corporations in the performance of their official functions, be-
cause the degree of care required depends upon the subjects to
which it is applied, the particular circumstances of the case, and the
usages of business. 10 9
Because of the vagueness of this standard, the sections below focus
upon the facts of the cases in which it has been applied, and the les-
sons that can be drawn from each. Unfortunately, the law does not
provide clear guidance for directors attempting to fulfill their duties. It
does, however, provide leeway for business decisions so long as those
decisions are made after a process that demonstrates care, diligence,
and attention to duty.
Absent evidence of any of these possible breaches, the businessjudgment rule attaches and a board's decision will not be scrutinized
by a court so long as it is not irrational. "Due care in the decision-
making context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit
of the business judgment rule." 110 Directors of corporations and credit
unions thus receive significant shelter from liability so long as they
follow a proper process in the course of their decision-making. This
process is the subject of the next section on the duty of care.
B. Duty of Care
Acting with such care "as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances" in the merger context
involves what is commonly referred to as "due diligence." ' Directors
must investigate and deliberate on the aspects of a proposed merger
enough to convince a court they made an informed business decision.
Directors "have a duty to inform themselves ... of all material infor-
mation reasonably available to them."112 But what is enough dili-
gence, and what is not?
Smith v. Van Gorkom supplies the primary example of a court giv-
ing content to the fiduciary duty of care in the context of a consensual
108. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
109. Grand Union Mount Kisco Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Kanaryk, 848 F. Supp. 446,
458 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
110. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
111. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 309, 7231 (2008).
112. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
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merger.113 In Van Gorkom, Trans-Union, a holding company, was hav-
ing difficulty generating sufficient income to offset large investment
tax credits. 114 The company had years to solve this problem before the
credits would be wasted, but an officer/board-member, Van Gorkom,
became fixated on the idea of a leveraged buy-out at fifty-five dollars
per share. 115 This value was derived largely from guesswork done by
the CFO, as opposed to a professional valuation of the company, and
was chosen by Van Gorkom based on the price for which he would be
willing to sell his shares.
116
The Van Gorkom court found the process the Trans-Union directors
followed in their initial decision to sell the company was reckless and
imprudent, and thus the board lost the protection of the business judg-
ment rule. 117 Additionally, the directors subsequently failed to take
sufficient action to correct that failure and regain the rule's
protection.118
The factors that can be derived from Van Gorkom on whether di-
rectors made an informed business judgment and thereby fulfilled
their duty of care are:
1. amount of time spent researching the deal, preparing for the
decision, and investigating the information and proposals;
2. amount of time spent deliberating whether to proceed with the
merger;
3. where any numbers and dollar amounts in the merger came
from, and whether they were based on solid financial informa-
tion or were arbitrary;
4. whether the merger proposal and subsequent deliberations
were unilateral or bilateral discussions, i.e. whether anyone ac-
tually opposed the idea or brought up opposing views;
5. whether directors had prior notice of what would be discussed
before the meeting in which they deliberated and voted;
6. whether the directors were presented with or sought outside in-
formation, such as a fairness opinion;1 19
7. whether the directors asked questions during deliberation over
the merger; and
113. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 865.
116. See id. at 865-69.
117. See id. at 871-74.
118. See id. at 883-84.
119. The Van Gorkom court made clear that a fairness opinion was not necessary to fulfill the
board's fiduciary duty, but suggested that it would have been a way to come closer to fulfilling
their duty. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876.
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8. whether the board sought other bids or shopped the deal with
other potential merger partners. 120
The court did not provide specific criteria or benchmarks for any of
these factors. While the facts in Van Gorkom present an example of
what does not pass the test,121 and there are cases which give examples
of what does pass muster, the lines between the two are not clearly
drawn under the Van Gorkom analysis. As a whole, the decision
stands generally for the premise that, to fulfill their duty of care, direc-
tors should seek information from both internal and outside sources,
give time for deliberation, fully analyze all information, be critical of
plans, and seriously consider alternatives.
While the facts and factors in Van Gorkom do not directly relate to
credit unions, the principles can easily be extended into concrete ad-
vice. To provide more detail to these duties for credit union directors,
it is helpful to examine them in a specific context. The NCUA has
suggested, in connection with conversions from federal credit unions
to mutual savings banks, 122 that the directors of a credit union, as part
of their due diligence, answer the following questions:
What financial services do the majority of my members want? How
do I know this? Can the institution best provide these services to its
members as a credit union or a bank? If the credit union converts to
a bank, how will that affect the rates and fees that the institution
charges the members for these services? And if the credit union
converts to a bank, will it be able to offer members (now customers)
something in the way of services or value that existing banks in the
area are not offering? 123
These questions are equally applicable in the merger context. After
asking these questions, deals should be structured only after receiving
reliable information on the value of the credit union, the potential
benefits and detriments of a merger (in general and with the specific
merger partner being considered), and the effects a merger will have
on the members and the credit union as a corporate entity. Naturally,
more than one or two directors should participate in structuring the
deal and reviewing information and all directors should have sufficient
time to fully review any materials and information provided. In many
cases where the board is found to have breached its duty of care, mul-
tiple directors either did not know the subject of the special meeting
120. See generally id. passim.
121. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (representing another
example of a breach of the duty of care).
122. Credit unions, particularly federal credit unions, may "convert" from a credit union to a
mutual savings bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1785(b)(2) (2000).
123. Conversion Final Rule, supra note 18.
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until they arrived or only had two to four days between hearing of a
merger proposal and a vote on it. Ensuring that enough time is taken
to evaluate information is vital to fulfill the duty of care.
C. Duty of Loyalty
As described above, the duty of loyalty encompasses both loyalty
and good faith. Breach of this duty can occur in many different ways.
In the consensual merger context, directors often place too much em-
phasis on who will continue to serve as directors and officers of the
surviving entity. 124 Another scenario which can give rise to a breach of
this duty is where one or more directors have a financial or reputa-
tional stake in the merger. Often, these are the individuals who are
driving the merger process.
125
For a conflict of interest to remove the protection of the business
judgment rule, the conflict must be "material." The Delaware Su-
preme Court in Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc. stated that "to disqual-
ify a director, for rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of
disloyalty," not self-interest alone.126 Examples of sufficient disloyalty
include, but are not limited to, motives of entrenchment, fraud upon
the corporation or the board, abdication of directorial duty, or the sale
of one's vote.127 The precise standard of proof required under the ma-
teriality standard was provided in a later appeal in the same case:
[A] material interest of one or more directors less than a majority of
those voting would rebut the application of the business judgment
rule if the plaintiff proved that the interested director controls or
dominates the board as a whole or that the interested director failed
to disclose his interest in the transaction to the board and a reasona-
ble board member would have regarded the existence of the mate-
rial interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed
transaction. 128
124. When taken too far this could potentially implicate the duty of loyalty (as discussed in
this section), though Gander v. Stephens suggests that "to argue that directors have an entrench-
ment motive solely because they could lose their positions following an acquisition is, to an
extent, tautological." No. 132, 2008, 2009 WL 188828, at *8 (Del. 2009). The court continued:
By its very nature, a board decision to reject a merger proposal could always enable a
plaintiff to assert that a majority of directors had an entrenchment motive. For that
reason, the plaintiffs must plead, in addition to a motive to retain corporate control,
other facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim that the Director Defendants acted
disloyally.
Id.
125. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d 345.
126. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Again, this analysis provides little guidance on the minimum stan-
dards to be followed in fulfilling a director's fiduciary duty. In the con-
sensual merger context, the duty of loyalty requires, at minimum,
disclosure of any self-interest to the other directors (and possibly the
members as well). Also, prudent directors will not act to entrench
themselves in their roles, but will be sure to exercise independent
judgment based upon what is in the best interests of the credit union
and the members.
It is important to note here the danger of entrenchment. A long
established rule under the duty of loyalty is that directors may not
vote solely or primarily to perpetuate themselves in office. 129 This rule
was established in Cheff v. Mathes in the context of a hostile take-
over, 130 but applies equally to consensual mergers. The Cheff court
analogized the case at hand to the use of proxy statements and stated:
[I]f the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that
the buying out of the dissident stockholder was necessary to main-
tain what the board believed to be proper business practices, the
board will not be held liable for such decision, even though hind-
sight indicates the decision was not the wisest course .... On the
other hand, if the board has acted solely or primarily because of the
desire to perpetuate themselves in office, the use of corporate funds
for such purposes is improper.131
Directors may thus be considered acting in bad faith or in a self-inter-
ested manner when perpetuating themselves in office to the detriment
of the credit union or its members. However, in the case of self-inter-
est, as explained in Cede, the interest would have to be material to
cause the decision to lose the protection of the business judgment
rule.
D. Other Jurisdictions
Due diligence principles for corporations in different jurisdictions
vary widely-from requiring enough due diligence to form a rational
decision on one end of the spectrum to requiring "full consideration
and documented analysis of all alternatives" on the other. 132 Thus
while the principle that some "diligence" is "due" extends across state
lines, the extent of the required investigation will depend on the spe-
cific rules in the applicable jurisdiction.
129. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mergers, Conversion and Termination Advance Notice, supra note 7, at 5464.
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V. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (NON-CONSENSUAL MERGERS)
A hostile takeover, in the corporate setting, is defined as the acqui-
sition of a company despite the management and directors' resistance.
While some jurisdictions allow shareholder voting on a merger prior
to board approval,1 33 many jurisdictions view the board of directors as
serving a gatekeeper function. Corporate hostile takeovers, unlike
consensual mergers, often involve stock purchase offers to give the
acquiring party a majority share in the corporation and thus dictate
the board vote. In the credit union context, traditional stock offers are
not possible, but the same principles concerning the duty of directors
may apply when they resist repeated merger requests or when an ac-
quiring credit union attempts to go directly to the members with
promises of a dividend, capital distribution, or some other incentive.
Law on credit union hostile offers has not developed because until
recently this phenomenon was entirely unknown. The first so-called
hostile bid on a credit union was made in the spring of 2007 by Wings
Federal Credit Union in an attempt to acquire Continental Federal
Credit Union.134 Since this time, the credit union industry has been
concerned about what, if any, standards apply in such situations. Some
jurisdictions have begun to regulate such transactions 135 and the
NCUA has begun to consider regulations on the subject, 136 but the
novelty of hostile bids for mutual institutions has not yet faded. While
the law on other fundamental corporate change issues has been vague
for credit unions, the absolute lack of guidance in the area of credit
union hostile takeovers necessitates a turn to the laws governing for-
profit corporations.
Delaware has the most extensive law covering fiduciary duties in
the hostile merger context. As discussed below, there is some gui-
dance available in California cases, but not with the nuance in the
Delaware cases discussed below. Over all, the reasoning behind the
specific rules governing director fiduciary duties in hostile takeover
situations is equally applicable to credit unions. This seems to suggest
that similar guidelines might also apply in the credit union context.
133. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 8012 (2008).
134. Styskal, Wiese & Melchione, LLP represented Continental Federal Credit Union in mat-
ters concerning the offer to its members by Wings Federal Credit Union.
135. See, e.g., Tex. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 91.1003 (2008).
136. See Mergers, Conversion and Termination Advance Notice, supra note 7.
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A. Cheff v. Mathes: The Historical Rule
Cheff v. Mathes, as explained above, established that boards cannot
act solely or primarily to perpetuate themselves in office. 137 Cheffspe-
cifically applied this principle to the use of corporate funds,138 but the
rule has since been expanded to become part of the general duty of
loyalty.139 In response to a hostile threat, the board of the target cor-
poration enacted defensive measures that included use of corporate
funds to repurchase shares of the company. 140 However, the defen-
dant directors in Cheff were not held personally liable for this defen-
sive tactic because they had an alternative business reason for their
actions: fending off "a reasonable threat to the continued existence of
Holland, or at least existence in its present form."'1 41 Thus, the histori-
cal rule in the case of hostile threats was that a board would not be
held liable for perpetuating themselves in office if there was a good
faith decision that the corporate interest would be served by it.142
B. Unocal: The Basic Rule in Hostile Takeovers
The modern rule for the fiduciary duty in hostile takeover scenarios
is found in Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 143 This case asserted
that in a takeover context, the duty of care and loyalty apply, and
therefore the directors owe a duty to protect the corporate enterprise
and also the interest of the stockholders.1 44 This also means that the
business judgment rule applies. The Unocal court, however, noted that
in a hostile context, there is a strong likelihood that the directors will
be entrenched and a decision to protect the corporate enterprise will
instead be a self-interested move to protect their positions. 145 As
stated in Cede & Co., the business judgment rule does not provide
protection in a case where there is evidence of "self-dealing."'1 46 Be-
cause of the inherent danger of resistance to the merger being self-
interested, a court will review the transaction thoroughly prior to ap-
plying the business judgment rule.
137. 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. Ch. 1964).
138. Id.
139. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55, passim (Del. 1985).
140. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 549.
141. Id. at 556.
142. "[hIf the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that the buying out of
the dissident stockholder was necessary to maintain what the board believed to be proper busi-
ness practices, the board will not be held liable for such decision, even though hindsight indicates
the decision was not the wisest course." Id. at 554.
143. 493 A.2d 946.
144. Id. at 958
145. Id. at 954.
146. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
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The Unocal court articulated a test for whether the business judg-
ment rule will attach.147 First, the board must have reasonable
grounds for believing there is a danger to corporate policy and effec-
tiveness. 148 Second, the vote must not be solely or primarily to perpet-
uate themselves in office. 14 9 Third, the defensive measures taken must
have a reasonable relation to the threat posed by the hostile at-
tempt.150 The following sections discuss these requirements in the con-
text of credit union hostile merger bids.
1. Reasonable Belief
The first prong of the test allows directors to resist hostile offers in
order to protect the corporate enterprise. 151 Many takeovers are initi-
ated by raiders, whose sole purpose in purchasing the company is to
break it apart and sell its constituent pieces, effectively destroying the
company as a separate entity. These offers are also frequently made
using highly leveraged securities, which will saddle the surviving com-
pany with large amounts of debt. While these circumstances do not
directly apply to credit unions, unsolicited offers for mergers by other
credit unions or financial institutions with lesser capital ratios or lesser
financial stability might be analogous. Additionally, the corporate en-
terprise of a credit union is unlike that of a stock corporation-credit
unions are member-owned cooperatives with the mandate to serve
and be loyal to their constituents exclusively. 152 Hostile attempts by
credit unions with similar fields of membership may have no other
purpose than to eliminate available sources of services in the market-
place, and thereby restrict competition. Hostile attempts by credit un-
ions with differing fields of membership might result in the loss of the
credit union's unique focus on its constituency. A takeover attempt by
a bank or other financial institution might also threaten a credit
union's corporate enterprise because of the threat to the exclusivity
and identity of the credit union, including its very nature as a mutual
institution, and the resulting decrease in competition in the financial
services market. Thus, the concept of a threat to the corporate enter-
prise of a credit union may make more sense than the same idea does
with stock institutions, and may occur more frequently.
147. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.




152. After all, credit unions traditionally have no customers other than their equity owners,
no equity owners other than their customers, and no equity owners or customers other than their
creditors.
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2. Not Perpetuate Oneself in Office
The second prong is designed to ensure the defensive actions were
not taken for self-interested reasons. 153 As explained above, acting
with the objective of perpetuating oneself in office has, since Cheff v.
Mathes,154 been considered a breach of fiduciary duty. This remains a
vital part of the Delaware analysis in the hostile takeover context.
3. Reasonableness of Defensive Measures
The third prong is also designed to ensure the defensive measures
are not self-interested. 155 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.
serves as an illustration of when defensive measures are not dispro-
portionate. 156 Ivanhoe Partners made a coercive offer and took a se-
ries of other actions that made it quite clear it would act contrary to
the interests of shareholders and the company. 157 In response,
Newmont, the target, took defensive measures. First, it approved
"golden parachutes" for twenty-five key employees and prepared to
take on large amounts of additional debt if any entity acquired more
than 50% of its stock. 158 Next, it paid a sizable dividend to the share-
holders, causing them to realize previously undervalued assets.1 59 This
in turn caused a previously affiliated company to purchase large
amounts of Newmont stock on the open market and obtain a 49.7%
interest in Newmont.160 Finally, Newmont negotiated with the previ-
ously affiliated company (and now near-majority owner) to obtain a
standstill agreement and maintain corporate independence. 161 The re-
153. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
154. 199 A.2d at 554.
155. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
156. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
157. The specific device used was a two-tier tender offer, which is classified as coercive be-
cause a higher price is offered for the first tier, making it more likely that individual shareholders
will sell in the first round. A credit union equivalent might be a per capita purchase offer, which
would cause small account shareholders to want to vote in favor but disadvantaging account
holders with large balances. The NCUA has declared such offers illegal for federal credit unions,
though they might still be possible for some state chartered institutions. See Media Release,
National Credit Union Administration, NCUA Responds to Wings FCU Proposal (Apr. 17,
2007), available at http://www.ncua.gov/news/press-releases/2007/MRO7-0417-2.htm; Letter from
Robert M. Fenner, General Counsel, NCUA, to Paul Parrish, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Wings Federal Credit Union (Apr. 17, 2007); Letter from Robert M. Fenner, General
Counsel, NCUA, to Bruce 0. Jolly, Jr., Venable, LLP (Apr. 13, 2007); Letter from Sheila A.
Albin, Associate General Counsel, NCUA, to Anita Gieser, President, Pepto Makers Federal
Credit Union (Sept. 29, 1997).
158. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1338 n.7.
159. Id. at 1339-40.
160. Id. at 1340.
161. Id.
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suit was that there was no sale of the company. All actions were inte-
gral parts of a defensive plan, and over all, the response maintained
shareholder value and corporate integrity.
The Unocal court emphasized that the protection of the business
judgment rule is not lost merely because the directors could benefit on
their shares by taking part in a defensive measure.162 The directors in
question in Unocal stood to benefit as shareholders because they had
the option to sell their own shares at the same time as everyone else.
Similarly, if a credit union proposes to resist a hostile takeover by sell-
ing to a bank or by instituting some modified poison pill, the action
would not be considered self-interested merely because the directors
as members can take part.
Specific facts that made resistance to a hostile merger attempt ac-
ceptable under the Unocal standard can be found in Katz v. Chevron
Corp.163 There, the board took defensive actions "only after an assess-
ment of the situation over the course of two months, including six
meetings and extensive discussion with retained expert advisers. 1 64
The board was advised of possible disruptive actions by the hostile
bidder, and the inadequacy of existing corporate defenses.165 The
board was also advised of the effects of new defenses on shareholder
value and shareholder voting, specifically the ability of shareholders
to maintain an effective proxy fight against management. 166 These ac-
tions seem to be the proper course of director action when faced with
a possible hostile bid.
C. Revlon: Director Duty When Sale and Breakup Are Inevitable
The duties discussed in Unocal were complicated by the holding in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.167 Revlon in-
volved a company that was clearly going to be sold and likely split
up. 16 8 The directors proceeded to take defensive action and accept a
deal that gave a lower or equivalent price to shareholders, but bene-
fited note-holders and particular bidders. 169 The Revlon court held
that Unocal still applies in inevitable sale situations, but when it be-
comes clear there is no interest in protecting the corporate enterprise
(as it will cease to exist when the company is inevitably sold), the only
162. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
163. 22 Cal. App. 4th 1352 (1994).
164. Id. at 1369
165. See id. at 1370.
166. Id. at 1370.
167. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
168. See id. at 182.
169. Id. at 179.
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duty remaining is the fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 70 At that
point, it is also clear there is no interest in preserving any services or
future earning potential for the shareholders, and therefore the inter-
est remaining is in getting the highest price possible for the
shareholders.1 7 1
Without the benefit of the above reasoning, the Revlon holding
seems anomalous: When the sale of a company becomes inevitable,
the directors have a duty to act as auctioneers and get the highest
price possible for shareholders. The missing piece in some explana-
tions of Revlon is that any takeover defense that is unrelated to share-
holder protection cannot be related to the threat to the enterprise
because there is no corporate enterprise interest remaining to pro-
tect.1 72 Thus, failure to act to get the highest price fails the third prong
in the Unocal analysis. Because it fails the Unocal analysis, the direc-
tors' defensive actions would not be entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule, and a court would therefore examine the
board's substantive decisions under the Weinberger total fairness test.
Later cases, particularly Ivanhoe, clarify that Revlon concerned
breaches of the duties of care and loyalty and only applies in the hos-
tile takeover context.173 Additional clarification came in Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., in which the Delaware Supreme Court
held that entering into the merger process does not trigger Revlon
duties by itself.174 Revlon only applies when the breakup of the corpo-
rate entity is inevitable. 175 In Paramount, Time's board contemplated
a merger with Warner that would have fluidly transitioned Time's cor-
porate process, business, culture, and control. 176 By contrast, in Rev-
Ion the board, in response to a bidder's offer, abandoned any long-
term plans and sought options that involved breaking up the
company.177
D. Delaware Law's Application to Credit Unions
As stated above, the Delaware law on hostile takeovers applies di-
rectly to for-profit corporations. It is only by analogy that these tests
would apply to credit unions and other non-profit cooperatives. A co-
operative's board of directors clearly owes a fiduciary duty to the en-
170. Id. at 182.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 182-83.
173. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.. 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
174. 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990).
175. Id. at 1150-51.
176. Id. at 1143-49.
177. Id. at 1150.
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tity. As noted, in some jurisdictions, directors also owe a duty directly
to the members; federal regulations may impose a similar duty to the
members. Credit union directors may also be motivated by entrench-
ment when confronted by an unsolicited merger proposal. This combi-
nation of circumstances is nearly identical to the situation in Unocal.
This warrants application to credit unions of the Unocal principle that
courts must be more suspicious of defensive actions in the face of a
possibly entrenched board.
Similarly, the principles in Revlon are not dependent on a corpora-
tion's capital structure-when it is certain that there will no longer be
a corporation to protect, the only remaining duty owed by directors is
to the shareholders. With a credit union, when it is certain that there
will no longer be an entity to protect, among the duties to corporate
entity and equity owners, only the duty to the members logically re-
mains.178 As applied to credit unions, the Revlon principles would dic-
tate that, in the face of an inevitably disappearing entity, the credit
union's directors would have to try to obtain the maximum value for
their members. The available options would include merger with an-
other institution, sale to a bank, or voluntary liquidation. The ques-
tions noted in the section on the duty of care above-what services
are important to the members and what options will either continue
services or create cash payments to members-are instrumental in de-
termining the best option for the members.
E. California Law
In California, only the law cited above in Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc.
is available in analyzing these issues. 179 In Eldridge, the California
Court of Appeal did not use standards like those found in Unocal,
instead stating:
[a] 'target' corporation's decision to accept or resist a takeover bid
... necessarily rests with the board of directors, since it is the direc-
tors, and not the shareholders, who are best able to evaluate the
numerous and often complex financial factors which must be con-
sidered in determining whether the takeover proposal serves the
best interests of the corporation. 180
Based on this statement, it appears that California courts are not as
concerned with the possible loyalty problem that arises with en-
trenched boards. Without the entrenchment worry, the hostile take-
178. This principle could arguably also extend to situations where the entity will become an-
other charter type or lose its nature as a mutual enterprise.
179. 186 Cal. App. 3d 767 (1986).
180. Id. at 776-77 (quoting Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa.
1985)).
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over context may be identical to the consensual merger context. Thus,
without developments in the attitude of California courts in the two
decades since Eldridge, the California analysis would not change.
A significant problem for the application of Revlon duties to credit
unions outside of Delaware is the possibility that directors will be
deemed not to owe duties directly to members. The application of fi-
duciary duties varies between jurisdictions. In the case of Revlon du-
ties, the reasoning that leads to the duty to auction depends on the
premise that, without a continuing institution, there is a residual duty
to members.' 81 Thus, the jurisdictionally based extension of the fiduci-
ary duty to members or shareholders is the lynchpin in any analogy to
Revlon. As discussed above, it is unclear whether directors of Califor-
nia credit unions have a fiduciary duty to the members as well as the
credit union itself.
Further increasing the uncertainty in this area is the fact that El-
dridge was decided before the Unocal and Revlon decisions became a
part of the common legal landscape. It is possible that today's Califor-
nia courts and other states' courts might follow the now well-estab-
lished and much-discussed precedents from Delaware.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evidenced by the above discussion, the law in the area of fiduciary
duties of credit union directors does not provide clear answers. The
ideal standards for corporate governance certainly differ from the
rules that govern liability. The tests reviewed in the foregoing sections
identify the minimum standards for director action, rather than defin-
ing the aspirational goals. Use of some of the tests, particularly in the
hostile merger context, could be jurisdiction specific, based on the
constituencies to whom a duty is owed. Application of any test to fed-
eral credit unions will depend on whether the statutes and regulations
provide specific guidance, whether the federal courts are willing to
create federal common law,182 and which state's laws courts decide to
apply.
In the consensual merger context, the business judgment rule will
likely apply absent one of the five factors that might remove its pro-
tections: ultra vires action, bad faith, self-dealing, fraud, or gross negli-
gence. With the protection of the business judgment rule, a court will
not examine the substance of a board's decision unless that decision is
181. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179-83 (Del. 1985).
182. See the discussion on choice of law above, specifically the decision in Atherton v. FDIC,
519 U.S. 213 (1997), and its possible application to federal credit unions.
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irrational. Directors need only establish a rational basis for their deci-
sions and go through a proper procedure to avoid liability. While the
nuances of this doctrine will vary between jurisdictions, it is, in es-
sence, a protective doctrine that will, to varying degrees, shield direc-
tors from liability.
In the context of a hostile takeover attempt, different standards
may apply. Because of the nature of a hostile takeover, there is an
inherent danger of directors refusing a merger out of self-interest and
a desire to perpetuate themselves in office. Therefore, some courts
apply greater scrutiny than they would in the case of a consensual
merger. If a jurisdiction's fiduciary duties run to members as well as
the entity, it is likely that a court would apply the Unocal test to a
credit union board's decision in the hostile context. In such a situation,
it is also likely that if it becomes inevitable that the credit union will
be sold or dissolved in a hostile context, the board will have a duty to
maximize member value under Revlon-like duties.
Beyond these general principles, credit unions, as well as other non-
profit and mutual institutions, remain without direct guidance; in
many jurisdictions, they remain entirely in the dark. As the trends to-
ward larger mergers, more frequent charter conversions, and more
complex transactions continue for credit unions, it is likely that litiga-
tion on these issues will increase. The rules for duties of credit union
directors when dealing with fundamental corporate change will slowly
be clarified through litigation, or through new statutes and administra-
tive rulemaking. Finally, we hope that this article will assist in bringing
light to this area of the law and providing guidance to the credit union
industry.
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